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33 “The south Korean authorities should discontinue the reckless confrontation with their compatriots and the racket against the ‘followers of the north,’ and choose to promote inter-Korean re- lations in response to the call of the nation for independence, democracy and national reunification. … All the Korean people must not tolerate the maneuvers for war and confrontation by the bellicose forces at home and abroad but stoutly resist and frustrate them.” To oversimplify somewhat, this means that what North Korea really wants is to exacerbate tensions in South Korean society by putting on a “happy face.” In an article carried by New Focus on Jan. 2, in-house propaganda wonk Jang explicated this very fact, saying that this year’s address tells him that 2014 is “a year for psychological warfare directed at South Korean citizens. This year, North Korea does not care for state-level or diplomatic progress in the sphere of inter-Korean relations. “The North Korean state desires instead to ‘engage’ directly with South Korean society, in order to exacerbate polarization along South Korea’s political spectrum with regard to pro-DPRK or anti-DPRK stances,” he explains. “North Korea will continue to express solidarity with South Korea’s opposition left wing when- ever it can in order to accomplish its psychological warfare objec- tives; and it will pursue civilian appeasement and engagement in the inter-Korean sphere to this end.” The reality is that, though it is a leading player in many eco- nomic sectors and home to a number of global brands, news about South Korea is not widely publicized beyond East Asia. Conversely, in spite of economic weakness and, or perhaps be- cause of, periodic displays of absurd conduct, plenty of people around the world know quite a lot about politics in North Korea; certainly more than about the peaceful, prosperous South. Such imbalances matter when it comes to extracting meaning from political spectacles like the New Year’s Address. What we ought to know, but may well not, is that South Korea has a round of regional elections coming up in June, including the politically influential job of mayor of Seoul, meaning that North Korea has one eye on encouraging favorable electoral outcomes. One effective way of doing so would be to allow emotionally af- fecting separated family reunions to take place, as happened on Feb. 20, while simultaneously appearing to tolerate “aggressive” joint U.S.-ROK military exercises. Another area where the North may expect to make gains concerns the recent prosecution of extreme left-wing lawmaker Lee Seok-ki for sedition; he was caught advocating for attacks on South Korean infrastructure in the event of war with North Korea in the spring of 2013. A case against the Unified Progressive Party, which Lee represents in parliament, is ongoing. This list of targets for North Korea’s strategically astute Jan. 1 speech is a long way short of exhaustive, but is sufficient to reinforce the main point. Only by finding the metaphorical Kopi Luwak coffee cherry of usable information in Pyongyang’s output and then marrying it to knowledge of the surrounding geopolit- ical reality can we hope to trace the meaning in North Korean excretions. ABOuT ThIS COLuMN Christopher Green is the manager of international affairs for Daily NK, an online periodical reporting on North Korean affairs from Seoul. The opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of Groove Korea. For more information, visit dailynk.com. Hair consultant from UK. Trained at Vidal Sassoon and TONY&GUY in UK Hair Salon in Sinchon